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PREFACE

Naturalist assumptions underlie much, if not most,
of our

modern knowledge.

C. S. Lewis is very concerned

about this, because the naturalist philosophy casts serious
doubts on the validity of our reasoning processes as well
as our moral judgments.

Lewis's philosophy is important

because it recognizes this .problem and attempts to offer an
alternative to the naturalist philosophy.
written

as an attempt

to systematize

This thesis is
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metaphysical

and epistemological theories.
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INTRODUCTION

C. S. Lewis is very concerned about the naturalist
assumptions which underlie much of modern knowledge.

He

to show that the naturalist philosophy, when taken

attempts

to its logical conclusion, undermines the validity of our
processes

reasoning

our

and

He

judgments.

moral

then

attempts to offer an alternative philosophy which can serve
as an adequate basis for our reasoning and ethics.
Lewis sees three

basic

naturalism, dualism, and
natural

process as

metaphysical

theism.

Naturalism

reality.

ultimate

the

exists is either a part of or a

possibilities:
views

Everything

the
that

product of this process.

Dualism asserts that there are two equal, uncreated, independent, and self-existing entities.
the

ultimate

including

is

the source of all

things,

nature.

We
in

He

reality.

Theism regards God as

will

discuss

order, emphasizing

and ethics.

these three

their

implications for

In the chapter on theism

the concept of God

metaphysical

theories

epistemology

we will also present

which Lewis espouses, along

with

his

reasons for doing so.
We will then discuss Lewis's epistemology.
examine first the theistic basis for it
tionship between reason and nature.

1

We will

and then the relaAfterwards we will

2
look at the reasoning
of

thinking,

process itself, considering the role

knowing,

imagining, and

language

in

that

process.
Finally, we will critique Lewis's epistemology from
the perspective of a pragmatic epistemology.

The choice of

a pragmatic epistemology for this purpose is based on its
widespread
will
gies

acceptance at

point out some
and

the

possible

present

time.

problems in

This critique

both

epistemolo-

will suggest a possible resolution for them.

CHAPTER I

NATURALISM

The Basic Naturalist Position
Lewis asserts

that

"What

the

Naturalist

believes

is that the ultimate Fact, the thing you can't go behind,
is a vast process in space and
its own
can

accord."'

assume

two

Naturalist

basic forms:

time which is going on

theories about this
materialism

and

of

process
emergent

evolution.

Materialism
The appeal of materialism is its simplicity.

reality solely in terms of physical

attempts to explain
bodies and events.

It

It holds that all such

bodies stand

a spatiotemporal relationship with one another

in

and that

all such events are interlocked with one another in space
and

time.
Materialism

is especially appealing

body problem arises.

when the mind -

The basic materialist position 2 on

1 C.

York:
1978).

S. Lewis, Miracles: A Preliminary Study (New
Macmillan, 1960; Macmillan Paperbacks Edition,
p. 6•
2The

basic materialist position presented here is
based on the the discussion found in Richard Taylor, Metaphysics, 2nd ed., Prentice -Hall Foundations of Philosophy
Series (Englewcod Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1974), pp.
12-13, 30-31.
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people are bodies, just as all other

this issue is that

things we observe are.
the

totality

It is much simpler to assume that a
parts

the

of

person

is

rather

than speculate about some

enables him to think rationally.

that

comprise

him

which

mysterious part

The materialist argues

how a physical object
that if it is difficult to understand
t to understand how an
could think, it is equally difficul
immaterial object could think.
immaterial mind seem
really solving any
Strict
mind

but

investigation

merely to complicate

matters

without

problems.

materialism
rejects

also

Theories which postulate an

not only rejects the concept of

the

concept

has determined

of

God.

Scientific

that events in the natural

ct physical laws.
world occur in accordance with stri
laws govern

without any apparent

without any regard
ality.

purposiveness, as well as

to such concepts as justice and

Many creatures,

including

of misery and suffering.

many

humans,

have

morlives

It is difficult to perceive any

rational purpose which is being served
that is being accomplished, or any
being expressed.

These

by this, any justice

moral virtue that is

The physical world is very clearly pre-

doing an excellent job
sented to our senses, and science is
out appealing to any
of describing and explaining it with
higher reality.
unnecessary, and

to be
The concept of God therefore appears
since it only raises philosophic

problems

d be better off dis(such as the problem of evil) we woul
carding

it.

5
Problems with Materialism
Lewis argues that materialism faces two insurmountable obstacles.

The first is an epistemological obstacle.

Lewis writes:
A theory which explained everything else in the whole
universe but which made it impossible to believe that
our thinking was valid, would be utterly out of court.
For that theory would itself have been reached by
thinking, and if thinking is not valid that theory
would, of course, be itself demolished.
It would have
destroyed its own credentials.'
Lewis's argument is that this is exactly
Materialism

does.

holds

that

all

materialism

what

events

are

physical

events which are interlocked in space and time.
view

thought is

merely

a

physical event,

ment of atoms in one's brain.

On this

namely the

The problem

move-

Lewis sees with

this position is that it renders logical grounds irrelevant.2

If thoughts are merely

preceding
of

physical events, then

physical events caused
they

will occur

whether there are logical grounds for them.

by

regardless
But logical

grounds are what is required if thoughts are to be judged
true or false.

It is meaningless to speak of a

cal event as being true or false.

mere physi-

If thoughts are merely

the movement of atoms in one's brain, then we cannot sensibly regard them as true or false.

If

we accept such a

view we must regard them as irrational.

Thus we see that

thought,

on

a

materialist

account,

'Lewis, Miracles, pp. 14-15.
2Ibid., pp. 16-17.

is

reduced

to

6
invalidity, and certainly cannot support a
theory.

metaphysical

has destroyed its own credentials.

Materialism

The second obstacle faced by strict materialism
to do

with its rejection of God.

has

Arguments against the

lessness
existence of God are generally based on the meaning
or the injustice of the universe.
genuinely

meaningless,

such as ourselves
own meaning?

who

then

how

has

But if the universe is
it

must either find

produced
meaning or

creatures
make our

How does a mere movement of atoms in space

and time produce a concern about meaning?

And if we are to

justice
say that the universe is unjust, our concept of
In order to base an argument against

must be meaningful.

we
the existence of God on the injustice of the universe
have
must assume that certain concepts, such as justice, do
meaning.'

But when we do this we have surrendered our main

point and destroyed our argument.

Emergent Evolution
However,

it

is

not

necessary

to espouse

such

a

strict materialism in order to hold a naturalist theory.
Naturalism can admit a certain kind of God, which Lewis
terms an "Emergent God."2

It is conceivable that the atoms

they
in the universe could get into such a relation that
give

rise

to

a

cosmic

consciousness.

It

is

even

Mac1 C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York:
45pp.
1960).
,
Edition
•millan, 1952; Macmillan Paperbacks
46.
2 Lewis, Miracles, p. 30.
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conceivable that this cosmic consciousness has thoughts.
But any such thoughts would be wholly caused by physical
events which, because they are neither true or false, are
therefore

unaffected

by

logical

grounds are necessary for
we

have

no

guarantee

grounds.

However, logical

rational thought to occur.

that

any

of

the

cosmic consciousness are rational.

Thus

thoughts of

this

Without such a guar-

antee, the concept of an emergent God cannot really help
the

naturalist

position.

The epistemological

obstacle

still has not been overcome.

Naturalist Accounts of Reason
inability

The
problem

is a

primary

to

overcome

this

weakness of naturalism.

is that the naturalist accounts of how
offer

no assurance

epistemological

that

reason

is

The

problem

reason arose can

valid. 1

Thus

the

naturalist finds himself in the awkward position of attempting to explain how such a reason as he has described has
the

power

of

perceiving

truths.

Let

us

look

at

these

accounts of rational thought to see why this is so.
Naturalism

attempts

to

provide

account of how reasoning arose in humans.

an

evolutionary

Humanity's first

thoughts were nonrational, merely responses to stimuli.
But

gradually

such

responses

were

refined

through

the

process of natural selection to the point where they became

1 Ibid., pp. 18-21.

8
rational.
refined

Lewis argues, however, that regardless of how
such

reasoning.

responses

As he

become,

they

cannot

become

points out,

. . . it is not conceivable that any improvement of
responses could ever turn them into acts of insight, or
even remotely tend to do so.
The relation between
response and stimulus is utterly different from that
between knowledge and the truth known.1
Knowledge

cannot

response;

it

be

can

obtained

only

be

through

obtained

refinement

a

through

of

inference.

Inference does not depend on any form of response, but on
the

perception of relations between ideas or concepts.
As an alternative to

naturalist

might

reason arose.

offer

an

the evolutionary account,

the

experiential

how

account

Continued experience of conjoined

of

events

might condition a person to expect one event when the other
was present.
such

Perhaps the practice of inference arises from

expectation.

However, expectation

rational thought. As Lewis
precisely when you
joined, therefore
the

discovery

cannot

produce

points out, "Reason comes in

make the inference 'Since always con-

probably connected' and

go on

to attempt

of the connection."2

The Contradiction of Naturalism
Neither of these naturalist accounts can explain
how reasoning arrives at truth, nor can they justify our
confidence in the validity of the reasoning process.

'
Ibid., p. 19.
2Ibid., p. 20.

The

9
Naturalist,

no

necessity

doubt, acknowledges the

rational inference

if

we are to arrive at any truths or

engage in any reasoning whatever.

But his account of how
He, in effect,

reasoning arises is inconsistent with this.
puts the

reasoning

process

itself

on

validity

of

reasoning

is

defended with more reasoning.

and

trial

attempts to defend it by means of reasoning.
the

of

questioned,

then

However, once
cannot

it

be

Lewis writes:

Inference itself is on trial: that is, the Naturalist
has given an account of what we thought to be our
inferences which suggests that they are not real
We, and he, want to be reassured.
insights at all.
And the reassurance turns out to be one more inference
(if useful, then true):--as if this inference were not,
once we accept his evolutionary picture, under the same
If the value of our
suspicion as all the rest.
reasoning is in doubt, you cannot try to establish it
by reasoning. If, as I said above, a proof that there
are no proofs is nonsensical, so is a proof that there
Reason is our starting point. There can
are proofs.
If
be no question either of attacking or defending it.
by treating it as a mere phenomenon you put yourself
outside it, there is then no way, except by begging the
question, of getting inside again.1
It appears then that the naturalist is faced
He can acknowledge something

with a choice.

besides nature

which

will

justify our belief that reasoning can arrive at truth, or
he

can

give

up all claim

to truth.2

If

he chooses the

former he has given up naturalism, for naturalism
nature

to

be

the

ultimate

reality.

It appears that to

remain a naturalist he must choose the latter.
glance this does not appear to give up too much.

'Ibid., p. 21.
2 Ibid., pp. 12, 21-22.

holds

At first
When we

10
use thinking to pursue practical goals we do pretty well.
But

when

we seem

we begin searching for truth

endless, and probably useless, speculation.

to end

up in

The problem is

that the theory of naturalism itself is a product of this
or

type

speculation.

The

concept

of

nature,

on

which

naturalism is based, is arrived at by means of inference.
But

naturalism

is

not

content

with

merely

inferring

a

concept; it goes on to assert that nothing exists except
this.
that

Surely this is the sort of
naturalism

is seeking

unverifiable speculation

to avoid.

If naturalism

is

willing to give up all claim to truth, how can it continue
to lay claim to its own truth?
Thus we see that the theory of naturalism contains
a self-contradiction.

It gives us an account of

which requires justification for our
yields truth.

Being

unable to

reason

belief that reason

provide such justification,

the claim for any truth is surrendered.

But when the claim

for truth in general is surrendered, the claim of truth for
naturalism

must also be surrendered.

CHAPTER II

DUALISM

The Dualistic Concept of God
We saw that when naturalism gives up any claim to
truth it destroys its own credentials.

We also saw that an

alternative to giving up any claim to truth is to acknowledge

that

there is something

besides nature

which can

jus-

tify our confidence in rational thought. An emergent God,
such as naturalism offers, is a part of nature and cannot
help us in this respect any

more than

nature itself can.

Let us, then, consider another type of God
of

who is not a part

nature.
We need

not assume at the outset that such a God

has created nature.
calls dualism.

We might adopt a theory which Lewis

He defines dualism

as "the

belief

that

there are two equal and independent powers at the back of
everything, one of them good and the other bad, and that
this universe is the battlefield in which they fight out an
endless

war."'

The

appeal

of

this

appears to solve the problem of evil.

theory

is

All of what

that

it

we call

good is derived from the good power, and all that we call
evil comes from the evil power. The question of a good God

'Lewis, MerP Christianity, p. 48.
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being responsible for the evil in the
in

world

does not arise

this context.

Problems in Dualism
Lewis, however, argues that this theory
fatal

problems.'

The

first is a

metaphysical

has two
problem.

Neither power can claim to be the ultimate ground of being.
The

reason for this is rooted

in their situation. Since

they are equal, neither one can claim responsibility for or
control over the situation.

Since they are independent, as

well as mutually opposed, it is extremely unlikely that
they cooperated in bringing about their situation.

Fur-

thermore, neither can escape from or overcome the other.
Thus,

their existence is conditioned

are in.

by the situation

This means that either that situation

unknown (and

higher) power

which

produced

that

they

or some
situation

is the ultimate ground of being.

If dualism cannot reach

the ultimate ground

it

of

being then

must

be rejected as a

metaphysical theory.
There is also a moral problem in dualism.

It gives

to evil the same sort of positive existence, independent
reality, and

internal

harmony as it gives to good.

But

then we have no basis for choosing one over the other.

Any

loyalty to goodness would
theory requires a standard

be arbitrary.

A sound ethical

which provides us a

basis for

'Ibid., pp. 49-50; C. S. Lewis, God in the Dock:
Lssays. on Theology and Ethics, ed. Walter Hooper (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970), pp. 22-24.
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approving good and rejecting evil.

Let us examine good and

evil to see if they deserve an equal status.
In

practice

the

two

are

Badness, on the other

Goodness is chosen for its own sake.
hand, is not.

to

badness merely

be

One chooses it in order to gain other things which

bad.
are

One does not choose

same.

the

treated

not

regarded

fact, one

In

as good.

be

cannot even

bad

without having good qualities, such as intelligence and
will.

Beings who are bad must receive these qualities from

the good

Beings who are good, however, need

power.

receive any qualities from a

bad

not

power in order to be good.

Evil thus appears parasitic, not on an equal footing with
good.
We see

then that

as genuinely good

regarding good

we have reason for

If this is

and evil as genuinely evil.

so, there must be a higher standard to which good stands in
a

right

and

relation,

relation. But

when

to

which

we appeal

evil

stands

to a standard

in

a

wrong

which is higher

than good and evil, it becomes apparent that they are not
the ultimate

basis of

with higher authority

reality.

There

must be something

than either of these.

Therefore,

dualism agiin falls short of the ultimate ground of being
and

must be rejected from the moral perspective also.

A Second Form of Dualism
Lewis also

presents another form

of

dualism.

Instead of having two equal, independent powers of good and

14
nature as being
evil, this dualism conceives both God and
self -existent,

This form

yet independent of one another.'

It is

m.
of dualism runs into an epistemological proble

have no
extremely difficult to conceive of two things which
relationship except coexistence.
taking

place?

Where is this coexistence

If it is occurring in some common space,
If it is

y.
then they are both part of some larger realit

ting and
not, then we must conceive them as merely coexis
nothing else.

one cannot hold a theory
form of dualism

Since

Lewis finds this impossible to do.

which one cannot conceive, this

must also be rejected.

Lewis goes on to point out that God and nature do
in

fact

occupy

have at
the

human

least

one

mind.2

common
This

is

relation:
the

heart

they
of

both

Lewis's

can
primary argument for the existence of God, which
termed an epistemological argument for theism.

be

He also

an ethical
offers a related argument, which can be termed
argument for theism.

Let us now discuss his arguments for,

and his views on, theism.

'Lewis, Miracles, p. 31.
2Ibid.

CHAPTER III

THEISM

An Alternative to Naturalism and Dualism
We have examined two
ralism
down

dualism.

and

metaphysical theories:

We discovered

because of its difficulties

knowledge.
dualism

We

also

discussed

discovered

breaks down

at

that naturalism

breaks

accounting for

in

that
the

natu-

the

first

problem

of

form
the

our
of

ulti-

mate ground of being, and that the second form discussed
runs into an epistemological problem.
theism

is

theories.
ment

for

the

most

plausible

Lewis argues that

alternative

to

these

two

We will look first at his epistemological argutheism

and

then

at

his

ethical

argument

for

theism.

Epistemological Argument
The basis for

Lewis's epistemological argument for

the existence of God is

might be termed the super-

what

natural element in rational thought.

In

using the term

"supernatural" in this context, Lewis is not intending to
imply

that rational

thought

is spooky

spiritual in a religious sense.

He writes:

or

that

it

is

We mean only that it "won't fit in"; that such an act,
to be what it claims to be --and if it is not, all our
thinking is discredited --cannot be
merely the

15
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exhibition at a particular place and time of that
total, and largely mindless, system of events called
"Nature." It must break sufficiently free from that
univer al chain in order to be determined by what it
s
knows.
'
If human reason is to avoid being discredited it must not
be causally linked to the interlocked system
Lewis argues that the view
the

primary

reality,

and

The only knowledge

situation.
through
nature

inference.2
exists

primary

is

the

Our

which regards nature as

reason

product of nature, has reversed

only

validity

as

merely

secondary

we

have of

basis for
of

such

nature comes

believing

that

inference.

The

reality for us, then, is reason; nature must be

not that

like

Lewis's

point

nature's existence is dependent on

validity of rational inference.
thing

a

the actual state of the

recognized as a secondary, inferred realicy.
here is

of nature.

nature

could

reasoning creatures such

exist

the

It is conceivable that a
without

as ourselves.

there

His

being

any

point is that,

since our knowledge of nature is dependent on the validity
of inference, we

must not construct a

picture of nature

which excludes the possibility of valid inference.
We need, then, a metaphysical theory which allows
for

the

possibility of

valid

to do this, such a theory
pendence from
1

nature.

rational inference.

In order

must grant to reason an

This does not mean

that reason

indemust

p. 23.

2 Ibid.; C. S. Lewis, Christian Reflections, ed. Walter
Hooper (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1967,)
pp. 62-03.
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be regarded as independent in an absolute sense.

It merely

means that, if inference is to remain valid, reason can
only

be dependent on something

which

One

is rational.

person's reason can show another person's reason that something is true.
preceding

As long as reason is always based on some

reason,

rational inference

remains

valid.

ever, such a regression cannot go on forever.

Now -

We need a

reason which is self-existent on which to base all other
reason.

Since human reason cannot plausibly be regarded as

self-existent,

we

must find scme other reason that can

he.

Lewis argues that
any thought is valid, such a Reason must
. . . if
exist and must be the source of my own imperfect and
Human minds, Lhen, are not
intermittent rationality.
the only supernatural entities that exist. They do not
Each has come into Nature from
come from nowhere.
Supernature: each has its tap-root in an eternal, selfexistent, rational Being, whom we call God.'
Let us now sum
for theism.

up Lewis's epistemological argument

If human reason is to be valid it cannot be

tied to nature in a cause-effect relation.
cause must be independent of nature.

Its source or

The most plausible

basis for human reason is a supernatural God
source or cause of

who is the

both reason and nature.

Ethical Argument
The Moral Law
The

basis

for

Lewis's ethical

'Lewis, Miracles, p. 28.

argument

for

the

18
existence of God is the moral awareness of mankind.'

It is

physical laws

which

obvious that

is subject to the

man

operate in the world
which
a

This law can

There is an

important

physical laws.

him.

But there is another

law

without, apparently, affecting nature as

affects man

whole.

around

be referred to as the

difference

moral law.

this law

between

and

the

One cannot choose whether or not one will

obey the laws which affect all bodies, such as the law of
gravity, or
laws

which

whether or not one will obey the biological
affect

all

organisms.

one

But

can

choose

whether or not one will obey the moral law.
Lewis argues that

mankind as a

whole is innately

aware of the moral law and has no need for it to be taught
to

him.2

This does not mean that there are not individuals

here and there who genuinely lack an awareness of the

moral

law, just as there are people who are color-blind or tonedeaf.

But in general, all civilizations at all times have

believed in the reality of the moral law.
that

may be

superficial,

noted
not

between the

basic.3

various

No civilization

of selfishness or injustice.

Any differences

moral systems are
has ever

approved

Even on the individual level

'Lewis, Mere Christianity, pp. 18-21.
2Ibid., p. 18.
3 An illustration of the basic similarity between
the various moral systems of humanity may be found in the
Appendix of C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (New York:
Macmillan, 1947; Macmillan Paperback Edition, 1965) pp. 93121.
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the reality of the

moral law is generally acknowledged.

Anyone will quickly protest upon being treated unjustly.
we violate

Also, when

moral law

we do

not deny

we make up excuses as to

reality; instead
violate

the

its

why

we had to

we

must deal

it.

Objections to the Moral Law
Before we go further in this argument

with some objections which are raised in connection with
the

moral

law.

One objection

merely an instinct
oped in mankind.

is that the

moral law

is

which, like other instincts, has develHowever, Lewis argues that this is not

the case,' since the moral law judges between instincts as
to which should be encouraged in particular situations.
often tells us to side
instincts or

to

It

with the weaker of two competing

strengthen

a

right impulse.

Furthermore,

instincts cannot be classified as good or bad.

The moral

law may insist on any one of them being suppressed at one
time and

being encouraged at another time.
Another objection to the moral law is that it is

merely a social convention or a product of education.
important point to observe here is that everything
is through educational processes,
mal.

Lewis acknowledges that

are mere social convention.

An

we learn

whether formal or infor-

many

of

the

things

we learn

On the other hand, there are

other things we learn, such as mathematics,
1 Lewis, .Aere Christianity, pp. 22-23.

which

must

be
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classified as genuine truth.
law

Lewis argues that the moral
As was pointed

belongs to the class of genuine truth.'

out earlier, all moral systems share the same basic law.
In addition to this, we judge some moral systems to be on a
higher level than others.

But we have no basis for such

judgments if there is not some real objective standard of
morality

which

to

we are aware of and

different moral systems.

which

we compare

Therefore, it appears that we

must acknowledge the moral law to be genuine.

The Aoral Law as Evidence for God
Lewis has made two important points thus far about
the

moral law: man is aware of it, but he continually vio-

lates it.
to

clue

Lewis maintains that this gives us an important

the

meaning of the

much about how

nature

universe.2

Science has told

works, but it cannot tell

us

us
why

nature is there, wnether there is any supernatural force
behind

nature, or if there is any meaning

in

the

universe.

This is because science can only operate by means of external

observation,

which

cannot

provide

necessary to answer such questions.

the

information

There is, however, one

thing in the universe which man can know more about than he
could

learn

merely

through external observation.

thing is man himself.
find

this moral law

That

When we look inside ourselves we

which

'Ibid., pp. 24-25.
2Ibid., pp. 30-34.

we cannot get rid of, but yet
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cannot obey.
man

could

It is important to note that this fact about

not

be

discovered

by

other

rational

species

to answer

here is

merely through external observation.
The question

we have been trying

whether there is more to the universe than mere nature.

If

there

by

is

more

than

nature,

it

cannot

merely observing the facts of nature.
only

case

where

we

can

obtain

the

necessary to answer our question.

be

Man himself is the

kind

And

discovered

when

of

information

we look

inside

man we find that there is more than mere nature.

Let us,

then, sum

Mankind

up Lewis's ethical argument for theism.

finds itself under a law which it did not make.
that there is some sort of being
nature, and
certain way.

which

It appears

is not a

which is telling us we ought to

part of

behave in a

This being is generally identified as God.

Let us now look at Lewis's conception of God.

Lewis's View of God
Pantheism vs. Monotheism
Lewis believes that there are two basic views of
God.'

One is pantheism and the other is monotheism.

There

are two basic differences between these two views.

The

pantheist view of God considers him to be beyond good and
evil.

The closer one gets to divinity, the more obscure

the distinction
Zinally

between

good

disappears altogether.

'Ibid., pp. 43-44.

and
The

evil

becomes until it

monotheistic

view,

on
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the other hand, considers good and evil to be very distinct
God loves good and hates evil.

from one another.

The second difference between these two views of
God concerns His mode of existence.

The pantheistic view

identifies, or very nearly identifies, God
verse.

with the uni-

God could not exist apart from the universe, for

all its different objects are the parts that God is composed

of.

The monotheistic view, on the other hand, makes

a clear distinction between God and the universe.

God is

the Creator, and the universe is His creation.
Pantheism is sometimes regarded as the most modern
religious innovation or the hi3hest refinement of man's
religious striving.

However,

Lewis argues that

pantheism

is possibly the oldest religion known to man, and appears
to be the natural inclination of the human mind.'
the concept of

God

that

return to time after time.

the unaided

It is

understanding

will

The understanding, on its own,

can only subtract human attributes (such as finiteness,
materiality, passability, and

mutability) from the concept

of God; it has no means of adding any positive attributes
of divinity. The result is that God comes to be viewed as
an abstract entity, and

generalized

terls such as 'Univer-

sal Being' and 'Guiding Principle' are applied

to Him.

Problems with Pantheism
•

However, there are a couple of
1 Lew's,
.
Miracles, pp. 81-83.

problems

with
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Pantheism which must be pointed out.
there exist

One is the fact that

many concrete, individual, determinate things.

It is difficult to understand how something abstract and
general could

be the source of such concrete and

reelity.

alized

Lewis

ultimate source of

points out

individu-

God

that "if

is

the

all concrete, individual things and

events, then God Himself must be concrete, and individual
in

the highest degree."1
As we saw

There is another problem with Pantheism.

in the moral argument for theism, a moral law exists within
us and is evidence that God exists.

This law also reveals

to us something about the nature of God, namely that He
insists on

right conduct and

attitudes, and

abhors

bad

It would seem then that we must

conduct and attitudes.2
conclude that God is good.

mean that He is indulgent.

This must not be interpreted to
It merely means that He wants

the right thing done regardless of how much it hurts or how
hard

it is.

incorrect and

However, if God

is good

then Pantheism

is

must be rejected.

Monotheism
God's goodness, however, presents us with a probIe m

Although

we acknowledge that God

is good, we are

making ourselves His enemies by our persistent disobedience
of

the

moral

law.

Once

we

realize this

lIbid., p. 87.
'Lewis, Mere Christianity, pp. 37-38.

we

begin

to
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perceive the inherent reasonableness of monotheism, for it
not only recognizes the problem of sin, but it also offers
a solution to it.
Pre-Christian images of God
Lewis espouses the Judaic-Christian tradition of
The crude images oi God that we find in the

monotheism.

Old Testament portray a sense of living and acting deity
rather

an abstract entity

than

that does or

demands

If this imagery is incorrect it is

nothing.

. . . not because the images are too strong but because
they are too weak. The ultimate spiritual reality is
not vaguer, more inert, more transparent than the
images, but more positive, more dynamic, more opaque.1
Lewis insists
ghostlike

or

that spiritual
less

real

than

is

reality
physical

contrary, it is richer and denser than

not

something

reality.

the

On

physical reality.

Perhaps the old images do not express God's moral
attributes as fully and accurately as we would

like.

How-

ever, in seeking to better understand the love and goodness
of God "we must beware lest we interpret 'moral attributes'
in

terms of

mere conscientiousness or abstract benevo-

lence."2 Furthermore, in denying that God

has passions,

we

must avoid the implication that His love is therefore less
than ours.

Passionate love is something that happens to

someone from time to time.

But love is not a temporary

occurrence for God; for Him it is a
1 Lewis, Miracles, p. 92.

2Ibid.

permanent state of
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being.
The

changelessness

and

peace

obscured by some pre-Christian imagery.

of

God

is

also

In correcting such

images care must be taken not to introduce new images which
make

the opposite error

of implying

inertia

or emptyness.

The stillness of God is not connected to slumber or inactivity.

Lewis writes that

Silences in the physical world occur in empty places:
but the ultimate Peace is silent through very density
of life. Saying is swallowed up in being. There is no
movement because His action (which is Himself) is timeless. 1
God's existence and action are not conditioned by space and
time.

The concept of space and time is merely a framework

which provides order for the natural world.

God and Nature
As was pointed out earlier, the monotheist makes a
clear

distinction

between

God

and

the

natural

regarding nature as a part of God's creation.

order,

Lewis puts

forth three observations as evidence in support of God's
creation of nature.2

The first is that nature appears to

be rebelling against its lawful sovereign.

For example,

when nature dominates one's thinking the result is irrationality and
one's

disorganization.

thinking

Secondly,

though

it

produces

nature

1 Ibid., p. 93.
2Ibid., pp. 32-33.

But

when

reason

rationality

itself

does

not

dominates

and

appear

order.
to

be
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intelligent, it is intelligible.

Natural events fit into

patterns which are intelligible to reason.
theory of creation
alternative

presents fewer

theories.

creating

nature

rational

thought.

than

It
to

When God created
distinct from

Himself.
not

is

existence

is

in

existence

is

necessary.

in

conceive

However,

existence

difficulties than

is easier

nature He

itself.

Himself.
He

to conceive

of

is

is

nature

God

producing

nature's
God's

the

the

principle

of

principle

of

only

thing

original

He is the

reality on

by

which nature depends, and

whose

thing

which all other things are derived.

constantly maintained and can

of

do

made it to be genuinely

Only

He

Finally, the

which

from

ultimate
nature is

be altered.

Miracles
The alteration of nature is what is commonly termed
a

miracle.

Miracles are 'generally considered

tions of the laws of nature.
misconception.
outrage,
from

be

viola-

Lewis argues that this is a

miracle is not

a

contradiction

but an event which nature could

not have

or

an

produced

her own resources alone. As Lewis points out, "The

divine

art

pattern

to

into

A

to

that
A

of

miracle

is

not

which events conform

an

art

of suspending

but of feeding

new

the

events

pattern."'
miracle

is

i Ibid., p. 60.

not caused

by

natural

processes
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in the same way that purely natural events are.
does not mean that it is uncaused.

But this

It merely means that

its cause is not in nature, but in the direct activity of
God.

On the other hand, though a miracle is not caused by

natural processes, it can produce results in the natural
world.

Though

it

is

not

interlocked

events preceding it, it is interlocked
its

with

the

natural

with those following

occurrence.

The probability of miracles
Hume's position
Miracles, by their nature, are rare events.
occurrence of
able.

any

particular

miracle

is

therefore

The

improb-

How then should we regard historical reports con-

cerning them?

Lewis writes:

Ever since Hume's famous Essay it has been believed
that historical statements about miracles are the most
intrinsically improbable of all historical statements.
According to Hume, probability rests on what may be
called the majority vote of our past experiences.
The
more often a thing has been known to happen, the more
probable it is that it should happen again; and the
less often the less probable.
Now the regularity of
Nature's course, says Hume, is supported by something
better than the majority vote of past experiences: it
is supported by their unanimous vote. . . . There is,
in fact, "uniform experience" against Miracle; otherwise, says Hume, it would not be a Miracle.
A miracle
is therefore the most improbable of all events.
'
The first objection to Hume's position concerns the uniformity of experience against miracles.
can

know

such

experience

'Ibid., pp. 101-2.

to

be

uniform

The only way we
is

to

know

in
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advance that all reports of miracles are false.
only

way

we

can

know

they

are

false

is

to

know

experience against miracles is, in fact, uniform.
position
prove

But the
that

Hume's

here is based on a circular argument which can

nothing.
Hume's

position

also

has a

deeper

problem.

His

conception of probability is dependent on the uniformity of
nature.

But the uniformity of nature itself is neither

probable or improbable; it is the assumption
before

we

must

make

we can discuss probability. As Lewis points out,

"Unless Nature is uniform, nothing is either probable or
improbable."'

Therefore,

the

question

of miracles cannot be answered
formity of nature.

of

the

probability

by appealing to the uni-

For when we ask if miracles occur, we

are asking if nature is always absolutely

uniform.

merely asking the same question two different

ways.

We are
But a

valid answer to a question cannot be obtained by assuming
the answer to another form of that same question.
Hume's argument against miracles, then, involves us
in a deadlock.

The sort of probability he proposes holds

only inside the framework of
of

whether

miracles

can

uniformity.

occur

scundness of that framework.

is

a

But the question

question

about

the

Once the framework of uni-

formity is thrown into question, the form of probability
Hume is using is suspended.
1 Ibid., p. 102.

Thus, we cannot regard

either
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the uniformity of nature or the occurrence of miracles as
probable or improbable.
find a new form of

It appears, then, that

we

must

probability.

Lewis's position
Let us look at the reasons we believe in the uniformity of nature.
causes,

two

of

Lewis thinks that "the belief has three

which

are

irrational."1

One

reason

is

We expect the situations we will encounter in the

habit.

future to be similar to those we have encountered in the
Another

past.

reason

is

that

belief

necessary if we are to plan our actions.
any

in

uniformity

is

If we are to make

plans we must ignore the possibility that nature

might

behave differently in the future than it has in the past.
What

we

continually

ignore

we

soon

forget.

Thus,

the

concept of uniformity comes to dominate our minds and we
believe it is true.
cannot confirm

These are irrational reasons

which

a belief to be either true or false.

Lewis is convinced, however, that there is another
reason

for

our

belief

in

the

uniformity of nature.

He

believes that we have an "innate sense of the fitness of
things."2

The

idea

of an irregular and

verse is totally repugnant to us.
in

uniformity

in

spite

we are continually

•

confronted

1 Ibid., p. 104.
2Ibid.

3f all

unpredictable

uni-

We hold onto our faith

the apparent irregularities
with.

Even

science

depends
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on faith in the uniformity of nature, for apart from such
faith there is no reason to attempt to make sense of all
the apparent irregularities of nature.

But do we

basis for trusting our sense of fitness?

have any

Does it reflect

any reality that is external to us, or is it merely a fact
Lewis writes that

about our psychology?

If
The answer depends on the Metaphysic one holds.
all that exists is Nature, . . . if our own deepest
convictions are merely the by-products of an irrational
process, then clearly there is not the slightest ground
for supposing that our sense of fitness and our conseabout a
quent faith in uniformity tell us anything
ourselves. . . . If Naturalism is
external to
reality
true we have no reason to trust our conviction chat
Nature is uniform. It can be trusted only if quite a
If the deepest thing in
different Metaphysic is true.
reality, the Fact which is the source of all other
facthood, is a thing in some degree like ourselves--if
it is a Rational Spirit and we derive our rational
spirituality from It--then indeed our conviction can be
trusted. Our repugnance to disorder is derived from
Nature's Creator and ours.'
This latter

metaphysic is the kind

modern science grew and

out of which

which it logically requires.

How-

ever, if we admit a theistic metaphysic of this sort, we
also admit the possibility of some miracles. However, we
then

also acquire a

basis for

believing

that nature is

uniform in the vast majority of its events.
tive

is

to

have

no

basis at all for our

The alterna-

belief in

uni-

formity.

The central miracle of Christianity
The

miracles that

'Ibid., p. 105.

do occur

are

not

random

or
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without reason.

The same power is behind

and the natural process, and

both fit into an overall unity

in God's purpose and design.
central

miracle

in

the

both the miracle

Lewis argues that there is a

Christian

faith

that

all

other

miracles either prepare for, exhibit, or result from.

This

is the incarnation, the heart of the Christian story, which
asserts "that what is beyond all space and time, what is
uncreated, eternal, came into nature, into human nature,
descended into His own universe, and rose again, bringing
nature

up

with dim."'

ity, of other
miracle.

The fitness, and

miracles is judged

However,

the

thus the credibil—

by their relation to this

credibility

the

of

incarnation

itself must be judged on some other basis.
The incarnation

is something

nature, would only happen once.
to

determine

the

degree

of

which, by its very

It is somewhat difficult

probability

of events that could only happen once.

for

the occurrence

Lewis's method of

judging the probability of such events is to consider the
extent to which they organize or

make sense of other events

or facts which are related to them.2
actually occurred
history of

it

the earth.

on the degree to

would

be

the

If the incarnation

turning

point

in

the

Therefore, its probability is based

which it integrates, organizes, and

helps

makes sense of the great body of knowledge which we have

'Lewis, God in the Dock, p. 80.
2Ibid., p. 81.
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about the earth and its history.

If it does a good job of

illuminating our knowledge, it is much less important that
we be able to fully understand

it.

Lewis discusses four key principles that the doctrine of
of.'

the incarnation illuminates and

helps

make sense

he first of these is the nature of man.

We argued

earlier that man consists of a natural organism
united

with a supernatural element which enables him to

reason.
nize

which is

Our awareness of

the

possibility

of

what we are enables us to recog-

the incarnation.

The incarnation,

in turn, helps us understand that our composite self is not
as

inconsistent

assumed.

with

the

rest

of

creation

as

might

be

If this doctrine is true, then we are actually an

image of the divine incarnation.
into the natural organism in a

The human spirit descends
manner similar to that in

which God's spirit descends into the human spirit.

This

points us to "a new key principle--the power of the Higher,
just in so far as it is truly Higher, to come down, the
power of the greater to include the less."2
second

area

that

Lewis

believes is

This is the

illuminated

by

the

doctrine of the incarnation.
The

pattern of descent and ascent permeates nature.

In the vegetable world, the seed descends into the ground
and ascends as a plant.

In the animal world, the life of

'Lewis, Miracles, pp. 110-19.
2Ibid., p. 111.
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fully grown organisms descends into the sperm and ovum,
which then unite in a womb and begin the ascent back to the
kind of life from which they came.
and

This pattern of descent
by ancient

ascent, of death and rebirth, was perceived

Thus arose the

man and then deified by his imagination.

nature religions with their dying gods who annually reenact
this

pattern.
This pattern is present in nature because it was
God is the creator of nature, and He

first present in God.

Therefore,

put His own character and principles into it.

the patterns we observe in nature are not arbitrary; as a
matter of fact, they give us a faint image of God.

This is

the reason Christ appears similar to the dying gods of the
nature religions.

These gods are deifications of God's

principles which are reflected in nature.
must not be confused

Christ, however,

with these other dying gods.

They are

mere shadows; He is the reality in whom the character and
He

principles of God are expressed fully and completely.

is no mere nature -god, but the God of nature who descends
into diseased nature and brings her back up with him into
the

light.
It is interesting to note that neither Christ nor

His followers ever draw any parallel between Himself and
the

dying

gods of

the nature religions.

religious tradition,
Christ's coming,

which

prepared

was continually

ship of such gods.

for

guarded

The Jewish

and

led

against the

up

to

wor-

The Judaic tradition was therefore the
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least likely to invent a dying god.

God's intention for

the Jews was that they be pointed away from mere shadows to
the

reality

whereby God
This

itself.

They

were

chosen

brings

us to

ciple of selectiveness.'
the idea of a chosen

the

third

principle

people.

man, Abraham, was selected.
was entrusted

The selection

that

the

This is the prin-

We prefer to think of all
However, Christi-

anity does not consent to such a view.

God.

vehicle

The modern mind is repelled by

religions as being on an equal footing.

him

the

manifested Himself to the world.

doctrine of the incarnation illuminates.

from

as

It teaches that one

The nation that was descended

with the knowledge of the one true

process continues as some of these

descendents are lost in the desert and others are left in
Babylon.
point:

a

This

process is finally

young Jewish

girl.

narrowed

to a single

She is chosen to

bear

the

child in whom God is incarnate, and through whom the world
is to be redeemed.
Although such a selective process is not in accordance with modern sentiment, it is the same sort of process
we see going on in nature.

In the vast space of the uni-

verse only a small portion is occupied

by matter.

only one of the countless stars has

planets.

Perhaps
Of

planets only one appears to support organic life.
the
•

multitude of seed

'
Ibid., pp. 116-18.

produced only a

these
Out of

minority achieve
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numerous animal species

Only one of the

fertility.

is

rational.
A distinction must be made, however, between the
selectiveness

of

nature

and

process is often cruel and

that

of

God.

wasteful.

The

natural

But selectiveness

operates on the divine level with neither cruelty or

waste.

It seems, then, that what at first appears to be a meaningless natural principle turns out to be a universal principle.

On

we see the proper operation of

the divine level

this principle.

On

the

natural level

we see

a

spoiled

version.
when God chose the Jewish people He was not playing
favorites.

They were chosen for the sake of mankind as a

It is through their sufferings as a

whole.

people, and

especially Christ's sufferings as a man, that humanity is
to

be

healed

and

redeemed.

This leads us to the final

principle we will discuss which the doctrine of the incarnation illuminates. This principle "may be called the principle

of

Vicariousness."'

It seems unjust that one group or
have to suffer for the sake of others.
also operates in nature.
own

resources.

else.

This

carnivorous

But

person should
this

principle

Nothing can survive solely on its

Everything is dependent upon everything

principle can
existence,

'
Ibid., p. 118.

be

and

a

source

even

more

of
so

horror, as in
in

parasitic
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existence.

But it is also a source of great joy, as when a

child is nourished and supported by its mother, both before
after

and

birth.

.0;e

see

then

that

result in either goodness or evil.

this

principle

can

Though it can result in

exploitation or oppression, it also makes kindness, generosity, and

In nature we often observe

gratitude possible.

the principle of vicariousness in a twisted or perverted
form, but in Christ we see it reach its ultimate level of
goodness.
;e are now in a position to evaluate how well the
doctrine of the incarnation deals with these principles.
lost

religions,

when confronted

respond in one of two ways.

with

the facts of nature,

Some merely reaffirm these

facts and grant to them a transcendent importance.

The

ancient nature religions, as well as the more contemporary
life-force religions, fall into this category.

The second

to

nature, or

type

of

response

is

to

deny

any

reality

regard it as an evil from which we shall eventually escape.
Buddhism and higher Hinduism fall into this category.

Nei-

ther of these responses sheds any new light on the facts of
nature.
these

Christianity, on the other hand, makes neither of

mistaken

responses.

It does not deny the reality of

nature, but neither does it deify it.

It acknowledges the

principles found in nature to be genuine.

It shows us that

those very same principles which are evil in
. . . all
selfishness and necessity are good in the
of
world
the
and understanding. Thus, as we accept
love
world of
the higher world we make new discoverof
this doctrine
world. . . . Here, at last, we find
lower
ies about the
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. .. a real illumination:
light from beyond Nature.'

Nature is being lit up by a

The incarnation also illuminates the fact of human
death.

The Christian doctrine regards death as the result

of sin.

It also views man as the unity of a natural organ-

ism with a rational spirit.
observe
spirit

between

the

body and spirit are abnormal.

must continually

resist the

inclinations of the body.
dominating

spirit

However, the relations we now

natural

The

tendencies and

Lewis believes that "Nature by

wrecks all spiritual activities:

spirit

by dominating Nature confirms and improves natural activitios."2

However, spirit -cannot resist nature's deterio-

rating forces forever, and death eventually occurs.
The incarnation
death.

uses

death

as

a

weapon

against

Christ, the perfect man who need not die, willingly

surrenders to death.

Because He is most fully and

com-

pletely alive He can descend the deepest into death.

The

principle of vicariousness allows his death

become

our

death, and his resurrection to become our resurrection.

He

to

descends into death and rises, bringing us with Him.
incarnation,

then, is the

means

whereby God

The

reconciles

humanity to Himself.
Let us recall Lewis's

method of judging the proba-

bility of events which, by their nature, could only
once.

happen

This method is based on the amount of illumination

'Ibid., p. 120.
2Ibid., p. 127.
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such an event casts on related events and facts.

We have

seen that the Christian doctrine of the incarnation illuminates some of the basic principles we observe in nature.
It also illuminates many of the mysterious facts we observe
about ourselves.
reasonably

Therefore, we can conclude that

probable.

it is

Lewis asserts that it "at one stroke

covers what multitudes of separate theories will hardly
cover for us if this is rejected."'

Evaluation of Lewis's Argument for God
Lewis's arguments for the existence of God cannot
provide us with logical certainty of God's existence.
appears to
argument.

be an

impossible

natural

for any

philosophical

However, his arguments do demonstrate that there

is reasonable basis for
It

task

That

might

should

belief in God.

be asked

be

why

required

at

arguments for
all.

t%'hy

the

would

supersuch

an

astounding fact as God's existence be so well hidden that
laborious argument is required to discover it?

IL would

seem that such a basic fact ought to be more obvious.

But,

as Lewis points out, the problem is not that the supernatural is so

well hidden, but that it is exercised

lives so frequently.2

Everytime

we

in our

perceive facts, or

think rationally, or make a moral decision the supernatural
is operational in

our

lives.

'
Ibid., p. 131.
2Ibid., pp. 40-41.

Our concentration is focused
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on

these other activities so

much

that

we

overlook

the

primary reality which makes them possible.
Lewis further argues for a

particular

view

of

God.

He attempts to show that the Christian view of God, which
is based on the incarnation, is the most plausible view.
His basic argument is that this view fits in with what we
know about ourselves and the world
view of God

better than any other

In addition, it throws new light on our

does.

knowledge of ourselves and the world, thereby helping us
understand

these

things

better.

Although this argument is

not as strong as Lewis's argument for theism, it does show
that the Christian
Christian -theistic

view of God
metaphysic

Lewis's epistemological theory.

is a reasonable view.
serves

as

the

basis

This
for

Let us now look at that.

CHAPTER IV

C. S. LEWIS'S EPISTEMOLOGY

Epistemology Based on Theism
We saw that the Naturalist could find nothing on
which to base his reasoning, and in the end had to give up
any claim for its validity.
the other

hand,

reason of God.
because our

bases

human

A theistic epistemology, on
reason on

the supernatural

Our rational convictions can

be

trusted

minds are rooted in a rational Creator.

Lewis believes that there is an objective order
the

universe

which

human

reason

can

discern.

In

in

fact,

human reason itself is a manifestation of that order.

He

asserts that
Where thought is strictly rational it must be, in some
odd sense, not ours, but cosmic or super -cosmic.
It
must be something not shut up inside our heads but
already 'out there'--in the universe or behind the
universe: either as objective as material Nature or
more objective still.
Unless all that we take to be
knowledge is an illusion, we must hold that in thinking
we are not reading ration,,lity into an irrational universe but responding to a rationaIr ity with which the
universe has always been satlrated.'
This objective order contains self-evident truths which are
directly perceived as rational, and are in fact the very
basis of rationality.

They are -ot deducible from other

'
Lewis, Christian Reflections, p. 65.
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principles, and cannot be proven.

Their reasonableness

rests within themselves.
These self-evident truths apply to the realm of
fact as well as the realm of value.'

When they apply to

facts

will

they

later.

are called

When

principals

of

they

axioms;

apply

practical

to

these

values

reason

or

they

be

are

traditional

discussed
called

moral

the

prin-

ciples.
Two basic views can be held about moral principles.
The first is that they are perceived
than

reason.

ples as

This view

nothing

more

by some faculty other

results in regarding moral princithan

subjective

sentiments.

The

second view is that they are perceived by reason as selfevident in the same way that the basic
or mathematics are.

principles of logic

Lewis espouses this second view.

He

writes:
I believe that the primary moral principles on which
all others depend are rationally perceived. We "just
see" that there is no reason why my neighbor's happiness should be sacrificed to my own, as we "just see"
that things which are equal to the same thing are equal
to one another.
If we cannot prove either axiom, that
is not because they the [sic] irrational but because
they are self-evident and all proofs depend on them.
Their intrinsic reasonableness shines by its own
light 2.
These traditional

moral principles cannot be justified

externally, for "they neither demand nor admit proof.3

'
Lewis, Abolition of Man, p. 53.
2Miracles, pp. 34-35.
3 Abolition of Man, p.
53.
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They can only be understood from

within.

Once they have

been accepted, however, their inherent reasonableness

will

be seen.
The objective order which Lewis believes to be in
the universe also includes the principles of logical inference.

Lewis insists that logical inference and the feel-

ings of certainty associated with it are not merely subjective phenomena.

If they

were,

we could

have no knowledge

at all, for "all knowledge whatever depends on the validity
of

inference."

Logical

inference

must

provide

a "real

insight into the way in which real things have to exist.
In other words, the laws of thought are also the laws of
things: . . ."1

Logic is not something that is foreign to

the universe.

Logic is a reflection of those same laws

according to which things in the natural world behave.
This is quite a different position from the naturalist view that the human mind, and thus reason, is merely
a
be

byproduct of the natural process.

If our reasoning is to

valid it must not be tied to the causal chain

nature.

within

The naturalist, having ruled out everything but

the natural system itself, cannot allow
independence.

reason any such

But unlike the naturalist, the theist

• • • is not commited to the view that reason is a
comparatively recent development moulded by a process
of selection which can select only the ,biologically
useful. For him, reason --the reason of God --is older
than Nature, and from it the orderliness of Nature,
which alone enables us to know her, is derived.
For
1 Lewi

s, Christian Reflections, pp. 62-63.
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him, the human mind in the act of knowing is illuminated by the Divine reason.
It is set free, in the
measure required, from the huge nexus of non-rational
causation; free from this to be determined by the truth
known.
And the preliminary processes within Nature
which led up to this “beration, if there were any,
were designed to do so.'
The theist believes that his reasoning is rooted in God,
not

in

nature.

God,

being

Himself

independent

of

the

natural system, enables our reasoning to achieve the necessary independence from that system in order to be rational.
This
minds.

In

does
view

not

mean

of all

the

that

God

errors

thinks

that

through

occur

in

our

human

thought and the many false conclusions that are arrived at,
this would be a tenuous position to hold.

To say that God

is the source of our reasoning ability means only that He
has provided us with the ability to think rationally.

We

must exercise that ability ourselves.

The Relationship of Reason and Nature
Reason is not connected to nature in the same way
that the interlocking
another.
source.

to one

Both reason and nature originate from the same
But there is no reciprocity in

between the two.
nature.

parts of nature are connected

the interaction

Rational thought can produce events in

For example, we can use the principles of mathe-

matics and

physics to construct

buildings and

bridges;

we

can also use arguments to change our emotions, or to induce
vtrtuous behavior.

On the other hand, it is impossible for

'Lewis, Miracles, pp. 22-23.
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nature to produce rational thought.
thought,

Nature can influence

but to the extent that it does so, thought ceases

to be rational.'

As

we saw earlier, rational thought must

be based on logical grounds, not irrational causes.

If a

train of thought can be explained completely in terms of
natural causes it cannot
Lewis
involved
the

does

be considered rational.

not

deny

in rational thought.

physical

thought.
produce

brain

The
only

is

brain,
disorder

its

and

the

human

brain

is

He does deny, however, that

solely
in

that

responsible
physical

for

state

irrationality.

rational

alone,
It

needs

can
an

organizing principle which is independent of the natural
system.

Such a

principle is found

in

supernatural reason.

Reason brings order into the disorder of nature.
The human mind is the point at which supernatural
reason meets the natural brain.

Lewis writes that

The rational and moral element in each human mind is
a point of force from the Supernatural working its way
into Nature, exploiting at each point those conditions.
which Nature offers, repulsed where the conditions are
hopeless and impeded when they are unfavourable.
A
man's Rational thinking is just so much of his share in
eternal Reason as the state of his brain allows to
become operative: it represents . . . the frontier
fixed between
Reason
and
Nature at that
particular
point. . . . What we call rational thought in a man
always involves a state of the brain, in the long run a
relation of atoms. But . .,. Reason is something more
than cerebral bio-chemistry'
Rational

thought

can

be

'Ibid., pp. 25-26.
2Ibid., pp. 39-40.

treated

as a

purely

natural
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phenomenon,
aspect.

but

such

a

treatment

ignores

an

important

We will return to this point shortly.
It is obvious that the

natural

reason

cated.

Any theory

and

the

natural

relationship
brain

between

super-

is extremely compli-

which proposes such a relationship gives

rise to problems, most notably the mind -body problem

which

has already been mentioned in the discussion of materialism.

This problem has proven to be one of the most diffi-

cult philosophical problems man has ever tried to solve.
No theory has ever provided a satisfactory solution, and
Lewis does not pretend
issue.

to have the final answer to this

Nevertheless, he

presents a concept

which

might

help us understand how a relation such as that between mind
and

body could

be

possible.

Lewis proposes the concept of transposition' as the
means whereby a richer medium can be expressed by, or manifested in, a poorer medium.

de does not claim

that this is

the only means whereby this can occur, but he does claim
that it is difficult to imagine another

means.

In calling

one medium richer than another, Lewis means that in one
medium

the possibilities for expression are greater and

more varied than in another.

Thus, when a richer medium is

being expressed in a poorer one, a particular response in
the poorer medium

may be utilized to express more than one

•
1 C. S. Lewis, The Weight of Glory and Other
Addresses (New York:
Macmillan, 1949; Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1965), pp. 16-19.
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meaning from the richer
flutter

in

the stomach

medium.

may

For example, the same

be used to express the emotions

of both intense joy and intense L.nxiety.

An observer look-

ing only at the physical level would conclude that these
two emotional

responses

were

identical.

However,

because

we are conscious beings we can observe these emotions from
a higher level and can perceive their different meanings.
Lewis

believes

that the

body is that of transposition.'
brain

is intimately involved

relation

between

mind

and

He acknowledges that the

with thought.

But he rejects

the view that thought is merely the movement of atcms in
the brain.

We have already discovered the major problem in

such a view in our discussion of materialism: it reduces
the words "true" and "false" to meaninglessness.

What is

required, then, is some sort of correspondence between
natural

brain and the supernatural reason.

dence need

not

he a

This correspon-

one for one relation.

physical response in the brain could

the

A

particular

possibly be used to

express more than one conscious meaning.

Thus, it is con-

ceivable that the brain, with a finite number of physical
responses, could

quite adequately

express an

almost

infinite variety of conscious meaning.
Lewis points out the inevitable error

which

occurs

when one approaches a transpositional relation from the

'Ibid., p. 24.
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poorer medium only.'

perspective of the
brain

quite

to the conclusion that thinking

naturally lead

is merely cerebral biochemistry.
such

All the facts support

thing overlooked is conscious

The only

a conclusion.

Studies of the

Lewis's concept of transposition is an attempt to

meaning.

show how an activity on the physical level can be a mani—
festation of a nonphysical reality, such as consciousness.

The Reasoning Process
Thinking
Matter

is

often

considered

immediate datum available to us.

the

simplest,

most

Things such as thought

and consciousness are regarded as inferred entities.

Lewis

disagrees with this. He believes tnat "Thought is what we
start from: the simple, intimate, immediate datum.
is the inferred

thing, the

Thinking can
psychologist
follow

sees

one another

But from

be

mystery.”2

viewed from two
as

thoughts
in a

:latter

subje-tive

person's

the point of view

perspectives.
events

psychological

The

which

history.

of the thinker, thoughts not

only follow one another, they follow from one arlother.

The

thinker has insights into relations between thoughts; he
perceives that one thought implies another.
nizes that thoughts are about

scmething

He also recog—

which

from the thoughts themselves.

'Ibid., p. 28
2 Lewis, Christian Reflections, p. 64.

is

distinct
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Two senses of the

word "because" can

be

explain the occurrence of a train of thought.'

used

The first

denotes a cause-effect relation: thought B occurred
thought

A

occurred.

If

thinking

is

merely

to

a

because

physical

event, this is the only possible form of explanation for
it.

However,

as

we

saw

earlier

in

our

discussion

of

materialism, it makes no sense to apply the terms "true"
and

"false"

to

physical

events.

Logical

grounds

are

necessary for these terms to have any meaning.
The second

sense of the word "because" reflects the

ground -consequent

relation:

thought A is true.

thought

3 is

true

A train of reasoning is valid only if

each step is in a ground -consequent relation
vious step.
ground

for

another

does

pre-

It has
as being on a

become

insure

the

occurrence

of

?
for another thought.-

popular to

regard scientific thought

higher level than other types of thought.

thought

forms, such as

not

Rational thought occurs when one thought

is seen to be the ground

as

with the

However, the mere fact that one thought is a

rational thought.

Scientific

because

is considered

metaphysical and

merely subjective.

objective

while other

moral thought, are

viewed

However, the cycle of hypothesis and

experimental verification in scientific thought depends on
logical inference.

Lewis points out that

'
Lewis, Miracles, p. 15; Lewis, God in the Dock, p.
146.
2 Lewis,

Miracles, p. 17.
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. . . the
material or external
world in general is an
inferred world and that therefore particular experiments, far from taking us out of the magic circle of
inference into some supposed direct contact with
reality, are themselves evidential only as parts of
that great inference.
The physical sciences, then,
depend on the validity of logic. . . . Experimental
verification is not a new kind of assur .nce coming in
to supply the deficiencies of mere logic. 'ATe should
therefore abandon the distinction between scientific
and non-scientific thought.
The proper distinction is
between logical and non-logical thought.'
There are some differences between the language used

in

science and that used outside the scientific disciplines
which

will

be discussed

later.

But these differences must

not obscure the fact that logical inference is essential to
any discipline that is attempting to

provide us with knowl-

edge.

Knowing
Apart

from

logical

inference

we

can

have

no

knowledge whatever. All we know immediately are our sensations.

All knowledge beyond

obtained through inference.

these immediate sensations is
If we regard

the certainty

associated with logical inference as merely a subjective
illusion we are, in essence, denying the possibility of any
genuine insight.

If we can have no genuine insight, we can

have no knowledge.

Therefore, we must regard

inference as

giving us a genuine insight into reality.
This is not to say that every single inference made
by

humanity results in true knowledge.

Error often occurs

'
Lewis, Christian Reflections, p. 62.
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in

human

thought.

inefficiencies

of

language,

inattention,

weariness,

Ignorance,

and

unconscious

fears

desires all influence human thought and often
faulty

reasoning.

Lewis

and

result in

points out that "We are therefore

driven to combine a steadfast faith in inference as such
with a

wholesome scepticism about each

particular instance

of inference in the mind of a human thinker."'

There is

an enormous difference between

this sort of scepticism and

scepticism about the reasoning

process itself.

we acknowledge
reasoning can

inference

to

be

valid

in

As long as

principle,

faulty

be corrected.

For an act of inference to be a genuine insight,
what is known through that inference
determining factor

must itself be the

in the knowledge acquired.

Lewis tells

us that
The act of knowing has no doubt various conditions,
without which it could not occur: attention, and the
But
states of will and health which this presupposes.
its positive character must be determined by the truth
If it were totally explicable from other
it knows.
sources it would cease to be knowledge. . . .L
Any

time an act of knowing occurs there

factors which could explain its occurrence.

may

be several

But. the knowl-

edge that is acquired by that act is what these explanations do not account for:
accounted for

that portion which can only be

by the truth known.

The act of knowing does

not consist of "remembering that something was so in the

'Ibid., p. 68.
2Lewis, Miracles, p. 18.
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past, but of 'seeing' that it must be so always and in any
world."

possible

The most basic pieces of knowledge that we perceive
We move by means of these from less knowledge

are axioms.

Axioms are sometimes referred to as

to more knowledge.

tautologies, but that is irrelevant.

It is simply another

way of saying that they are completely and certainly known.
Anytime

we are

we say that one assertion implies another,

admitting that at bottom

necessarily

not

tautologies are
tologous only in

one contains the other.

proportion

Lewis asserts that "If

obvious;

But such

they are

to one's insight into them.

Nature

is a

totally interlocked

system, then every true statement about her . . . would
tautology
in

to an

intelligence

acquired

about
by

the

means

universe

of

believes that it would
mind

grasp

that could

that

be a

system

Lewis appears to believe that all true

its entirety."2

knowledge

tau-

logical

could,

in

principle,
But

reasoning.

he

be

also

be too complicated for the human

to grasp in its entirety.3 Thus, he acknowledges that

there are limitations to human knowledge.
Lewis

also

believes

that there

is a

conflict

involved in acquiring human knowledge: the intellect is
abstract, while experience is concrete.

1..hen

'Ibid., p. 23.
2Ibid., p. 20.
3Lewis, Christian Reflections, p. 68.

we experience
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we come into contact

reality
when

we

begin

particulars and

with

particular

to think about reality
to generalize.

begin

things.

But

move away from

we

It seems, t:Ierefore,

intellectual knowledge are

that experiential knowledge and
mutually exclusive.
Lewis argues that
this problem. As he

myth is a

points out, "In

partial solution to
the enjoyment of

a

great myth we come nearest to experiencing as a concrete
what can otherwise

be

understood

“1
only as an abstraction.

Reality is what abstract truth is about.
enables us to do more than

However, myth

merely know an abstract truth

about universal reality; it puts universal reality into a
form

which

It is obvious that

we can experience.

myth

cannot bridge the gap between the abstract and the concrete
for all our knol - ledge.

But it is perhaps the best means we

have for conveying certain types of knowledge.

Imagining
Lewis distinguishes between thinking and imagining.2

The

mental images

which

accompany

our

distinct and different from those thoughts.

thoughts are

The images may

be entirely false, even absurd, while the thoughts themselves are true.
which accompany

Many times we are aware that the images
our thoughts are false.

But there

are

times when we mistakenly believe such false images to be

'Lewis, God in the Dock, p. 66.
2Lewis, Miracles, pp. 71-73.
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Nevertheless, our

true.

being

mistaken

such

about

images

does not necessarily invalidate the thoughts which those
images accompany.
Imagination

is

very import,..nt to our thinking.

It

is impossible to talk about things which are not perceived
by

the

senses

without

speaking

metaphorically.

things in such sciences as psychology,

many

There

are

economics and

politics, as well as things in poetry and religion, which
could

not

be discussed

without using images.

It

would

therefore be foolish to attempt to remove these images from
our

thought.
On the other hand, an overactive and overly vivid

imagination can be a hindrance to thinking.

It can cause

us to pay

we do to the

more attention to the image than

thought process it is intended

to assist.

We

must keep in

mind that images are merely aids to our thinking, and not
the essence of

it.

Language
Lewis

clearly

distinguishes

our

thinking

from

the

language we use to express it when he writes:
. . . thinking seems to me something other than the
succession of linked concepts which we use when we
successfully offer our 'thought' to another in argument. That appears to me to be always a sort of translation of a prior activity: and it was the prior
activity which alone enabled us to find these concepts
and links.'
1
•

Lewis, Christian Reflections, p. 139.
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The extent to which we can express our thoughts in language
good

is a

Fur-

indication of the quality of our thinking.

thermore, language is the only means we have of communicatour thought to others.

ing

Lewis points out three basic categories of lan-

and

Both

poetic.'

guage: ordinary, scientific, and

scientific

poetic language are merely improvements of ordinary
Scientific language is superior to ordinary in

language.

quantitative

its

measurements

precision.

which can

communicates

It

or

be either verified

precise

falsified

by

others.
The superiority of poetic language over ordinary
language is somewhat more elusive.
not

does

consist in

express or

ability

of

arouse emotion, although

poetic

poetic

appeal to our senses.

language

to

language often

The essence of its superiority

that.

does

the

Lewis maintains that it

lies in

its

It uses things we have experienced

to convey to us things which are outside our experience.
It also uses a great deal more adjectives than straight
prose

does.
The information conveyed through poetic language is

not

precise

scientific

and

verifiable

language. It

like

is information

language cannot possibly convey.
restricted

to information

•
'Ibid., p. 129.

that

that can

conveyed

through

that scientific

Scientific language is
be

quantified.

Poetic
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language, on the other hand, conveys qualitative inforIt tells us what things are like.

mation.

It is important

to note that the information poetic language offers can
only be obtained if one is willing to meet it halfway.

One

must experience what the poetry has to offer in order to
derive any knowledge from it.
Religious language lies somewhere between poetic
and ordinary language.
language, which
language

It is distinct from

utilizes

a

form

similar

to

religious information.

to convey

theological
scientific
Theological

language attempts to use abstract terminology to express or
clarify
reality.

what

religion

Religious

considers

language

also

the

ultimate

concret2

conveys information, but

it is qualitative information like that conveyed

in

poetic

language, and it must be met halfway.
Lewis argues that religious experience, insofar as
it must be expressed
special case.

by

means of poetic language, is not a

;lost of what we experience must be expressed

in a similar manner.

It is the measurable aspects of our

experience, that wnich can be expressed

by

means of scien-

tific language, that is the exception to this rule.

Lewis

writes that
The very essence of our life as conscious beings, all
day and every day, consists of something which cannot
be communicated except by hints, similes, metaphors,
and the use of those emotions (themselves not very
important) which are pointers to it.'
•
1 Ibid., p. 140.
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Lewis therefore appears to regard language as having
nite limitations in expressing what we really mean.
theless,

it

thoughts and

is the

only

meanings.

means

we

have

to

defi—
Never—

express

our

Perhaps the best we can do is to be

aware of its limitations as we use it.
This
temology.

concludes

our

discussion

of

Lewis's

epis—

The theistic metaphysic on which Lewis bases his

epistemology allows h - m to account for the role of both
reason and nature in human thought.

While the naturalist

must view thought as tied to the natural system, the theist
is able to grant it enough independence from the natural
system to be truly rational.
epistemology.

Let us now critique Lewis's

CHAPTER V

A PRAGMATIC CRITIQUE OF
C. S. LEWIS'S EPISTEMOLOGY

Lewis's Epistemological Tradition
Lewis's epistemology appears to be in the tradition
of the rationalists.

He believes that reason gives us a

genuine insight into the
the

general

principles that structure

world, that these principles are directly perceived

through rational intuition, and that they are absolutely
certain.

He further believes that apart from such rational

foundation we can have no knowledge.1

A Pragmatic Critique
Rational Intuition
The pragmatist does not deny that such a thing as
rational intuition

occurs.

What he denies is that it

pro-

vides us with any absolute certainty about our knowledge.
His objection is "that self-evidence, indubitability, or
even universal agreement by attentive minds cannot possibly
guarantee that a statement is true."2

The pragmatist would

'bid., pp. 62-71; Lewis, Miracles, pp. 14-24, 34an, pp. 52-53, 61-62.
35, 105; Lewis, Abolition of

ti
.
sm:

2 Bruce Aune, Rationalism
An Introduction (New York:

Empiricism and PragmaRandom House, 1970)
P•

•
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acknowledge that rational intuitions appear to us to be
certain.

But he questions whether this implies that they

are logically necessary.
not

How can we be sure that they are

merely psychologically necessary?

How

can

we distin-

guish between psychological and logical necessity?
A possible reply from Lewis's perspective is that
the answer depends on the metaphysic one holds.
minds are rooted
confident that
necessity.

our

in a rational creator, then
perceptions of certainty

If our

we can

imply

be

logical

On the other hand, if our minds are not rooted

in a rational creator, if they are merely a by-product of
the natural process, then the most we can claim for our
perceptions of certainty is psychological necessity.

Necessary Truth
The pragmatist also questions the concept of necessary truth.

It is obvious that many statements appear to

us to be true, but it is rather mysterious why it is necessary

that they

be true.

Lewis's view is that necessary

truth is rooted in the character and
character and
be

true.

The

nature of God: His

nature make it necessary that certain things
pragmatist

would

reply

to

this

that

the

existence of such a God cannot be established with anything
approaching absolute certainty.

Therefore, the concept of

God cannot provide the guarantee of necessary truth that is
needed.
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The Certainty of Logical Principles
The
t ion

the

that

certain.

pragmatist

principles

logical

basic

The pragmatist has attempted

principles

these

also question Lewis's conten-

would

generate

paradoxes

It must

when

they

are

applied

most certain about could

even those logical laws we are
be false.

to demonstrate that

It is conceivable that

to certain types of statements.'

shown to

absolutely

are

be

be noted here that the pragmabasic logical

t ist, like Lewis, accepts the

principles.

Their point of disagreement centers around the certainty of
these
as

principles.

merely

reasoning.
avoid

The

accepted

generally

principles

pragmatist regards these
rules

which

govern

our

They enable us to structure our knowledge and

contradictions.

Furthermore, it is "up

to

us to

decide which principles of inference we are prepared to use
and

to support."2

The primary concern of the pragmatist is

not whether these principles can

provide us

with a founda-

t ion of certainty; his primary concern is the degree of
practical success these principles achieve in systematizing
our

knowledge.
There are two main points which Lewis would dis-

agree

with

here.

principles as
second

is the

The

merely
idea

first

is

generally
that

'Ibid., pp. 111-15.
2Ibid., p. 116.

we

the

concept

accepted

can

decide

of

logical

rules, and
which

ti7e

logical
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principles we will accept and

which we

will reject.

two

logical

principles are, in

points are related.

If

These

fact, merely rules which mankind makes up and agrees to
use, then, of course, he is free to accept or reject them.
But it is far from clear that logical principles can

be

regarded in this manner.
The statements used

by

pragmatists to demonstrate

the uncertainty of logical principles are special cases
whose

truth

recognized.

value or

meaningfulness is not universally

Nevertheless, as a result of these,

many

have

felt compelled

to modify some of these logical principles.

However,

modifications only

these

affect these

principles

superficially; they do not change their central meaning.
In fact, it is exceedingly difficult to conceive a totally
and substantially different system of logical principles.
Lewis's view is that such a system is impossible to
conceive.
of

logical

He rejects the view that mankind is the source
principles.'

Therefore

man

is

not

free

to

accept or reject them, and cannot make up new ones which
are different in substance from those we already have.

The

belief that man is free to do this is based on the alleged
uncertainty of logical principles.

But Lewis believes that

this uncertainty results from the misunderstanding that
because their certainty cannot
fore nonexistent.

These

be guaranteed, it is there-

principles are the starting

'
Lewis, Christian Reflections, p.

point
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of our reasoning.

It is by means of them that the argument

for their uncertainty is made.

But such basic principles

nor admit proof.”1

"neither demand

The Certainty of Knowledge
Another objection

which

the

pragmatist

might

toward Lewis's epistemology is perhaps more serious.
absolute certainty is required for knowledge, then
not

have

very

much

knowledge.

Lewis

obviously

make
If

we cancannot

assume the absolute certainty of such things as memory, the
external

world, and

other

minds, and

he

does

not.

He

recognizes the facts that human thought is often faulty,
that the external world is inferred, and that we have no
certainty

of

does

appear

not

the consciousness of
to

absolutely certain.

regard

our

others.

knowledge

He furthermore
in

general as

He acknowledges the fact that progress

takes place both in our scientific knowledge and our knowledge

in

genera1.2

concerned

is

not

primarily

with the certainty of our individual pieces of

knowledge, but
itself.

It appears that he

with the certainty of the reasoning process

It is of little consequence that we cannot know

everything

with absolute certainty; but it would

be disas-

trous if, as the pragmatist asserts, we could know nothing

'Lewis, Abolition of Nan, p. 53.
2 Lewis, Christian Reflections, pp. 61-64, 67-68,
140; Lewis, God in the Dock, p. 45.
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with absolute certainty, including the truth of the basic
principles.

logical

Resolution
The basic difference, then, between the epistemologies of Lewis and the pragmatist centers around the certainty of basic logical principles.

In spite of this basic

disagreement between Lewis and the pragmatist, they are in
agreement that, whatever we say about knowledge, we will
The reasoning of both will be based on

continue to reason.

the assumption of logical

The pragmatist will

principles.

assume these principles without ascribing any certainty
them; he

will

merely regard them as provisionally adequate

rules of reasoning
good

to

which are subject to revision should

reason arise for it.

Lewis, on the other hand

assume them as having absolute certainty.

will

But his reason

for this assumption will be a pragmatic one: if they have
no certainty, we can have no knowledge.
It appears, then, that pragmatic assumptions are
unavoidable.

Perhaps

the

pragmatist

is

correct

in

asserting that there is no absolute logical guarantee that
reasoning is sound.
point.

But Lewis raises a

important

An essential part of one's view of the world is an

explanation

for

the

reasoning to have.

soundness

the

present

or

validity

we

assume

Naturalism cannot offer an adequate

explanation for this.
fact,

very

Theism, on the other hand, can.

Western "ideals

regarding

In

the character!
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of the world . . . as a lawfully related, humanly understandable system u l logically require, and originally grew
out of, a theistic metaphysic.2

In addition, Lewis pre-

sents some compelling reasons for choosing theism over
naturalism.

Theism, then, appears to be a more reasonable

basis for an epistemology than does naturalism.
Perhaps a theistic

metaphysic could reconcile the

strong points of both rationalism and pragmatism.
alism

Ration-

ppears to assert too much about the certainty of

our logical principles.

Certain assumptions seem to be

unavoidable regardless of which theory we adopt.
pragmatism

appears to regard the basic logical

too lightly.
connection

However,

principles

The feeling of certainty we experience in

with these principles seems to imply more than

the pragmatist allows.

It appears, then, that some sort

of compromise is in order.
There are,
phy.

Nevertheless,

no doubt, problems in Lewis's philosohe

brings some important insights

the study of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics.
efforts to correct the damage caused
naturalist assumptions in

to
His

by the prevalence of

modern thought deserve

more

serious attention.
1 Aune,

Rationalism, Empiricism and Pragmatism,

175.
2 Lewis,

Miracles, pp. 105-6.
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